Honest Politics NZ Have your say
Draft Member's Bill · New Zealand · 2026

It's illegal to lie to your employer, bank, IRD, or court. Why can politicians lie to you?

The Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Bill would change that — by holding New Zealand MPs accountable when they deliberately deceive the public. Not for honest mistakes. Not for opinions. For deliberate, knowing lies and misleading spin.

Jump to a section — or scroll to read the whole thing

Correction window
48 hours

to fix an honest mistake — no penalty applies.

Penalty ladder
5 steps

warning → censure → fine → prosecution.

Independent watchdog
7-year term

non-renewable, so the Commissioner has no incentive to please anyone.

Built-in safeguards
10-yr sunset

mandatory review at 3 years; the Act auto-expires at 10 unless Parliament renews it.

01 — The problem

Right now, MPs can lie to you almost without consequence.

Inside Parliament — parliamentary privilege gives MPs absolute immunity for anything they say in the House. The existing rule against "deliberately misleading Parliament" has such a high bar it's almost never enforced. MPs can simply "correct" the record afterwards.

Outside Parliament — Section 199A of the Electoral Act 1993 prohibits false statements to influence voters, but only on the 2 days before election day. For the rest of the 3-year term, MPs can say whatever they want on social media, in press conferences, in campaign material. No legal consequence.

Meanwhile, national security surveys in 2022 and 2023 found misinformation and disinformation rank among the top national security threats New Zealanders are concerned about.

02 — Integrity is the standard

In every other job, lying has consequences. Politicians are the one exception.

New Zealand law is built on the idea that when other people rely on your word — your patients, your clients, your employer, the court, the shareholders — dishonesty carries real consequences. Right across the workforce, integrity isn't optional. It's the baseline.

Politicians, of all people, should be held to the highest standard of honesty — not the lowest. They hold more power than anyone else in the country, and their words shape policy that affects every New Zealander. Yet today they answer to less accountability than any other profession. The current system makes a mockery of the integrity we demand from everyone else.

If you lie under oath in court…

Perjury. Up to 7 years' imprisonment — 14 years if it leads to wrongful conviction. (Crimes Act 1961, ss 108–109)

If you're a doctor and you mislead your patients…

Suspended or struck off the medical register by the Medical Council. Career over. (Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003)

If you're a lawyer and you're dishonest with the court or your client…

Struck off by the NZ Law Society. The legal profession treats dishonesty as the single most disqualifying conduct there is. (Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006)

If you're a company director and you mislead your shareholders…

A criminal offence. Fines, imprisonment, disqualification from being a director. (Companies Act 1993, s 377; Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013)

If you're a public servant and you breach the honesty code…

Dismissal under the Public Service Code of Conduct — which expressly requires honesty. (Public Service Act 2020)

If you lie to your boss about your work…

Serious misconduct. Fired — often without notice. Routinely upheld by the Employment Relations Authority. (Employment Relations Act 2000)

If you're an MP and you lie to the entire country…

Nothing happens.

Outside the 2 days before an election, there is no statutory accountability. Inside the House, parliamentary privilege is absolute. The most powerful office-holders in the country are the least accountable for what they say.

The public servants who work for MPs are required to be honest. The lawyers, doctors and accountants who advise them are required to be honest. The shareholders' meetings, the boardrooms, the courtrooms — all required to be honest. Why should the politicians at the top of all of it be the only ones who aren't?

03 — What's changing

Four Acts. Targeted amendments. No new powers anyone doesn't already need.

The bill makes narrow, carefully-drawn changes to four existing laws. Below: what each one says today, and what it would say if this passes.

Parliament Act 2025 — parliamentary privilege

Today

MPs have absolute immunity for anything said "in proceedings in Parliament" — via Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. No court or external body can question it. Deliberate lies in the House have no external remedy.

If the bill passes

A narrow exception — but only the House itself can switch it on. Before any investigation of in-House speech, Parliament must pass a resolution authorising that specific case. Privilege otherwise stays absolute. This keeps the limitation on Article 9 inside Parliament's own constitutional authority, where it belongs.

Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 — Article 9

Today

Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 is part of NZ law: "the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."

If the bill passes

A proviso is added: Article 9 does not prevent the Political Integrity Commissioner from investigating knowingly false statements of material fact, subject to the safeguards in this Act. The Commissioner is a parliamentary officer, not a court.

Electoral Act 1993, s 199A — false statements to influence voters

Today

False statements to influence voters are prohibited — but only during the 2 days before election day + election day itself. Outside this window: nothing. Social media, press releases, campaign material across the 3-year term are unregulated.

If the bill passes

Extended to cover the entire parliamentary term. Expanded to explicitly include social media, press statements, and official communications. Aligned with the new "knowingly false statement" and "misleading spin" definitions. A new s 199B targets misleading spin to influence voters.

NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 — freedom of expression

Today

Section 14 guarantees freedom of expression. Section 5 allows reasonable limits "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Political speech is interpreted broadly.

If the bill passes

The bill is built on a robust Section 5 justification using the Hansen v R proportionality test. It targets only deliberate falsehoods and intentional misleading conduct. Genuine opinions, honest mistakes, and corrected statements are explicitly protected. The Attorney-General will assess it under Section 7.

03 — How it works

An independent watchdog. A 48-hour out for honest mistakes. A graduated response.

The Commissioner

Independent. Single 7-year term.

  • Appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House. Cannot be reappointed — so no incentive to please the government of the day.
  • Can only be removed by the Governor-General on an address from the House for proven misbehaviour or incapacity.
  • Cannot have been an MP or party member in the past 5 years. Must hold a legal qualification of 7+ years' standing.
  • Budget set by the cross-party Officers of Parliament Committee, not by Cabinet. Salary set by the Remuneration Authority and can't be cut during their term — so an aggrieved government can't defund them in retaliation.

The 48-hour correction window

Honest mistakes? Just fix it.

When the Commissioner notifies an MP of a complaint, the MP has 48 hours to publicly correct the statement. If they do — and the correction meets all requirements — the matter can be closed without a finding or penalty.

The correction has to appear on every platform the lie appeared on, with equal or greater prominence, and stay up for at least 1 year. Deleting it before then is itself an offence.

The penalty ladder

Graduated, proportionate, predictable.

  1. 1Warning — formal, published. First finding.
  2. 2Public censure + mandatory correction. Second finding, or failure to correct after warning.
  3. 3Fine up to $50,000. Third finding, or a single serious falsehood causing public harm.
  4. 4Enhanced fine up to $100,000. Repeated pattern of deliberate misinformation.
  5. 5Criminal prosecution — referred to the Solicitor-General. On conviction: fine up to $200,000, prison up to 2 years, possible disqualification from office.

The safeguards

Built so it can't be weaponised.

  • Genuine opinions are protected. But saying "I believe" before a lie doesn't make it an opinion — the Commissioner looks through the form to the substance.
  • Honest mistakes are protected. If the MP didn't and couldn't reasonably have known, no penalty.
  • You only go to prison for actual lies. Criminal charges (the top two rungs of the ladder) require the prosecution to prove the MP actually knew they were lying — beyond reasonable doubt. The lower hybrid standard only applies to administrative warnings, censure, and fines.
  • Right of appeal to the High Court on any finding.
  • Vexatious complaints can be dismissed without investigation. Investigations into statements made inside Parliament require a vote of the House to authorise them.
  • Mandatory review at 3 years. Sunset at 10. If it doesn't work as intended, Parliament can let it expire.

Actionable

Deliberate lies. Misleading spin used to create a false impression.

Not actionable

Genuine opinions. Honest mistakes. Statements corrected within 48 hours.

Look-through rule

"I believe…" before a known lie doesn't immunise it. Substance over form.

04 — The full bill

Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Bill

Draft for discussion · 2026 · Government Bill format

Explanatory note

General policy statement

This Bill establishes a framework to hold members of Parliament accountable for deliberately making false or misleading statements to the public. It creates the office of the Political Integrity Commissioner, an independent statutory officer with the power to investigate complaints, make findings, and impose graduated penalties. It also establishes a Political Integrity Committee to provide ongoing parliamentary oversight.

The Bill amends the Parliament Act 2025, the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, and the Electoral Act 1993 to create narrow, carefully defined exceptions to existing protections, enabling accountability for deliberate dishonesty while preserving the essential functions of parliamentary privilege and freedom of expression.

The Bill targets only knowingly false statements of material fact and deliberate misleading spin — not genuine opinions, honest mistakes, or statements corrected within a reasonable timeframe.

Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

The right to freedom of expression affirmed in section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is subject to the limitation in this Bill. This limitation is considered to be a reasonable limit prescribed by law that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The limitation targets only deliberate falsehoods and intentionally misleading conduct by members of Parliament in their public capacity. Genuine opinions, honest mistakes, and corrected statements are expressly excluded. The graduated penalty regime ensures proportionality.

Preliminary · Title, Commencement, Purpose, Interpretation

1   Title

This Act is the Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Act 2026.

2   Commencement

(1) This Act comes into force 6 months after the date on which it receives the Royal assent.

(2) The Commissioner must be appointed under clause 6 within 3 months of the date on which this Act receives the Royal assent.

3   Purpose

The purpose of this Act is to —

(a) protect the integrity of New Zealand's democratic processes by holding members of Parliament accountable for deliberately making false or misleading statements; and

(b) establish an independent Political Integrity Commissioner to investigate complaints and enforce standards of factual honesty in political communication; and

(c) establish a Political Integrity Committee to provide ongoing parliamentary oversight of political integrity; and

(d) create a graduated penalty regime that is proportionate to the seriousness and frequency of the conduct; and

(e) ensure that corrections to false statements are publicly accessible and enduring; and

(f) balance these objectives with the protection of genuine freedom of expression, honest mistakes, and legitimate political debate.

4   Interpretation

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, —

Commissioner — the Political Integrity Commissioner appointed under clause 6.

Committee — the Political Integrity Committee established under clause 26.

correction window — a period of 48 hours from the time the Commissioner notifies a member of a complaint or investigation, during which the member may make a correction that meets the correction requirements to avoid escalation of penalties.

knowingly false statement — a statement of fact that the member knew, or ought reasonably to have known, was false at the time of making it; includes a factual claim disguised as opinion.

opinion used as vehicle for falsehood — a statement framed as opinion, belief, or attribution that contains or implies a specific factual claim the member knows to be false. Includes:

(a) prefacing a false claim with "I believe", "I think", "in my view", "in my opinion";

(b) attributing a false claim to unnamed sources ("many people are saying", "some experts think");

(c) framing a false factual claim as a rhetorical question;

(d) expressing a "purported opinion" that necessarily depends on an underlying false factual claim.

misleading spin — a statement of material fact that, while not entirely false on its face, deliberately misrepresents a specific identifiable matter with the intention of creating a false impression. Limited to three categories: (a) cherry-picked numerical or statistical data (including repeated use of conditional/maximum figures as if guaranteed); (b) quotations or sources materially reversed or distorted; (c) factual claims about identifiable historical events, government actions, expenditure, or policy outcomes. For the avoidance of doubt: differences of opinion, predictions of future policy outcomes, value-based interpretations of agreed facts, and rhetorical emphasis are not misleading spin.

Drafting note — May 2026: tightened from the original broad definition to require a specific identifiable misrepresentation within one of three concrete categories. Protects ordinary political argument under NZBORA s 5 (Hansen v R minimum-impairment) while still catching statistical spin, misquotation, and false claims about government actions.

material fact — a factual claim that could reasonably influence public opinion, policy decisions, or voter behaviour.

public harm — demonstrable harm to public health, safety, democratic processes, or public trust resulting from a false or misleading statement.

public platform — proceedings in Parliament; select committee proceedings; personal or official social media; press conferences; media interviews; campaign material and advertising; official communications and press releases.

Part 1 · The Political Integrity Commissioner

5   Political Integrity Commissioner established

(1) There is established an officer called the Political Integrity Commissioner.

(2) The Commissioner is an officer of Parliament for the purposes of the Officers of Parliament Committee.

6   Appointment of Commissioner

(1) The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of Representatives.

(2) A person must not be appointed as Commissioner if that person —

(a) is, or has within the preceding 5 years been, a member of Parliament; or

(b) is, or has within the preceding 5 years been, a member of a political party; or

(c) holds any office that could reasonably give rise to a conflict of interest.

(3) The Commissioner must hold a legal qualification of not less than 7 years' standing.

7   Term of office

(1) The Commissioner holds office for a single term of 7 years.

(2) The Commissioner is not eligible for reappointment.

(3) The Commissioner may resign at any time by written notice to the Speaker.

8   Independence of Commissioner

(1) The Commissioner acts independently in performing the Commissioner's functions.

(2) No Minister, member of Parliament, or other person may direct the Commissioner.

(3) The Commissioner is funded by a Vote administered by the Office of the Clerk of the House.

(4) The Commissioner's budget is reviewed by the Officers of Parliament Committee under Standing Orders, bypassing Cabinet. Cabinet must not propose appropriations for the Commissioner outside this process.

(5) The Commissioner's salary is set by the Remuneration Authority and cannot be reduced during the term of office.

Drafting note — May 2026: subsections (4) and (5) added to mirror the funding protections of the Auditor-General, Ombudsman, and Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. Prevents retaliatory defunding by an aggrieved government.

9   Removal from office

The Commissioner may be removed only by the Governor-General, on an address from the House, for proven misbehaviour or incapacity.

10   Functions of Commissioner

The Commissioner's functions are to —

(a) receive and investigate complaints about knowingly false statements and misleading spin made by members on any public platform; and

(b) initiate own-motion investigations where there are reasonable grounds; and

(c) make findings and publish reports; and

(d) issue warnings, public censure notices, and fines under the graduated penalty regime; and

(e) refer serious or repeated cases to the Solicitor-General; and

(f) maintain a public corrections register; and

(g) provide quarterly and annual reports; and

(h) promote public awareness of the standards expected; and

(i) advise the Political Integrity Committee.

11   Powers of Commissioner

(1) The Commissioner may —

(a) require any person to provide documents, information, or evidence; and

(b) require any member to appear and answer questions; and

(c) enter and inspect public-entity premises connected to a member's capacity as an MP, with reasonable notice; and

(ca) on the issue of a District Court warrant under subsection (1A), enter and inspect other premises occupied by or on behalf of a member; and

(d) access any publicly available social media content posted by or on behalf of a member.

(1A) A District Court Judge may issue a warrant under (1)(ca) on application by the Commissioner if satisfied the entry is necessary, proportionate, and (in the case of a dwelling) supported by exceptional grounds.

(2) Failure to comply without reasonable excuse is an offence under clause 37.

Drafting note — May 2026: split the original blanket "enter any premises with reasonable notice" power into public-entity (no warrant) and other premises (warrant required). Mirrors the Auditor-General (Public Audit Act 2001 ss 25, 29) and Ombudsman (Ombudsmen Act 1975 s 18). Required for NZBORA s 21 compliance.

12   Complaints

(1) Any person may lodge a complaint with the Commissioner.

(2) A complaint must be in writing, identify the member and the statement, and explain why it is believed to be knowingly false or misleading spin.

(3) The Commissioner must acknowledge receipt within 5 working days and make an initial assessment within 20 working days.

13   Own-motion investigations

The Commissioner may commence an investigation without a complaint where there are reasonable grounds. The member must be notified within 5 working days.

14   Investigation procedure

The Commissioner must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice, give the member a reasonable opportunity to respond, notify them of the correction window, and complete the investigation within 90 working days unless exceptional circumstances require an extension.

15   Investigations of proceedings in Parliament

Before investigating a statement made in proceedings in Parliament, the Commissioner must be satisfied on evidence available without reference to proceedings in Parliament that there are substantial grounds to believe the statement was knowingly false or constituted misleading spin, and that the member had personal knowledge of the facts.

The Commissioner must also seek and receive a House resolution authorising the investigation. The motion may be moved by the Privileges Committee or any member. The Commissioner cannot exercise any powers under clause 11 against in-House speech without this resolution. The House may vary or revoke the authorisation at any time.

Drafting note — May 2026: replaces the original "Speaker's leave" with a House resolution. The carve-out from Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 is now exercised by Parliament itself, not invoked by a statutory officer — which is the only constitutional way to limit parliamentary privilege (Prebble v TVNZ; Jennings v Buchanan).

16   Findings

The Commissioner makes one of: substantiated (knowingly false); substantiated (misleading spin); not substantiated; or substantiated with adequate correction within the window. All findings are published with reasoning.

17–20   Warnings, censure, fines, referral

See the graduated penalty regime in clause 38. Fines: up to $50,000 (third finding), up to $100,000 (fourth+ or pattern). Criminal referral to the Solicitor-General for persistent serious harm or non-compliance.

21   Correction requirements

(1) A correction must —

(a) be posted on every platform where the original statement appeared;

(b) be given equal or greater prominence than the original;

(c) clearly identify the original statement, explain why it was false or misleading, and state the correct facts;

(d) be kept publicly visible for at least 1 year;

(e) be notified to the Commissioner for the corrections register.

(2) Burying a correction in a reply or footnote, or posting it at a low-visibility time, does not satisfy these requirements.

(3) Removing a correction before the 1-year period is itself an offence (clause 36).

22   Corrections register

A public, freely accessible register on the Commissioner's website, listing the member, the original statement, the date and platform, the correction, and where it was posted. Entries kept for at least 5 years.

23–25   Reporting, staff, resources

Annual report to the House by 30 September. Quarterly report to the Committee within 20 working days of quarter-end. The Commissioner may employ staff as necessary.

Part 2 · The Political Integrity Committee

26   Committee established

A select committee of the House — the Political Integrity Committee — is established as a subject select committee for the purposes of Standing Orders.

27   Composition

(1) 5–8 MPs reflecting the proportional composition of the House, plus 3 independent lay members.

(2) Lay members must be persons of recognised standing in law, journalism, or public administration, and must not be current or recent party members.

(3) Lay members appointed by the Speaker for a 3-year term, renewable once. They participate and recommend but do not vote.

28   Functions

Review the Commissioner's reports; examine trends; call members to appear and explain; publish quarterly public report cards; recommend censure; refer matters back to the Commissioner.

29   Quarterly review

Meet within 20 working days of receiving each quarterly report. Additional meetings as required.

30   Power to summon

The Committee may require any MP to appear and answer questions, with the same effect as a select committee summons.

31   Public report card

Within 40 working days of each quarterly report, the Committee must publish a report card summarising findings, identifying members the subject of substantiated complaints, and noting trends. Published on the Parliament website.

32   Recommendation of censure

The Committee may recommend that the House censure a member, with a report setting out the grounds.

Part 3 · Offences and penalties

33   Offence of making knowingly false statement

(1) A member commits an offence who, on a public platform, makes a statement of material fact that the member actually knew to be false at the time of making it.

(2) The prosecution must prove actual knowledge of falsity beyond reasonable doubt. The "ought reasonably to have known" limb in clause 4 applies only to administrative findings under Part 1, not to criminal proceedings.

(3) Defences: (a) did not actually know the statement was false; (b) made an adequate correction within the correction window.

(4) On conviction: fine up to $200,000, or imprisonment up to 2 years, or both.

34   Offence of misleading spin

(1) A member commits an offence who, on a public platform, engages in misleading spin with the intention of creating a false impression of material fact.

(2) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt both actual knowledge that the underlying facts contradicted the impression created and actual intention to create that false impression.

(3) Defences: did not actually intend to mislead; statement in full context not misleading; adequate correction within the window.

(4) On conviction: fine up to $200,000, or imprisonment up to 2 years, or both.

Drafting note — May 2026: criminal offences now require actual knowledge (subjective fault) beyond reasonable doubt. The hybrid "knew or ought reasonably to have known" standard remains for administrative findings under Part 1 (warnings, censure, fines). Mirrors NZ criminal law tradition (R v Harney; FMC Act 2013 s 259 — civil hybrid, criminal subjective). Aligns the offences with the bill's stated policy of targeting only deliberate lies.

35   Failing to comply with correction requirement

Offence to fail to comply with a correction order. On conviction: fine up to $50,000.

36   Deleting a correction

Offence to remove, hide, or reduce the accessibility of a correction before the 1-year period expires. On conviction: fine up to $50,000.

37   Failing to comply with Commissioner's order

Offence to fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement under clause 11. On conviction: fine up to $25,000.

38   Graduated penalty regime

(1) First finding → warning. Second / failure-to-correct → public censure. Third / demonstrable public harm → fine to $50,000. Fourth+ / repeated pattern → fine to $100,000. Persistent serious harm or refusal to comply → referral for prosecution.

(2) The Commissioner may depart from the schedule where seriousness warrants, but must record reasons.

39   Disqualification from holding office

On conviction under clause 33 or 34, the court may disqualify the person from candidacy and from holding office for up to 5 years.

40   Correction window

48 hours from notification. If a compliant correction is made, the Commissioner may close the investigation without a finding, or record a finding without penalty. The window does not apply where the original statement was made with deliberate intention of causing serious public harm.

Part 4 · Amendments to other enactments

41   Amendment to Parliament Act 2025

After the provision providing for the effect of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688, insert:

"Nothing in this section prevents the House of Representatives from authorising, by resolution, the Political Integrity Commissioner (established under the Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Act 2026) to investigate specific statements or classes of statements made in proceedings in Parliament. Where such a resolution is in force, the Commissioner may receive and investigate complaints about the statements specified in the resolution, and make findings and impose penalties under that Act. No other investigation by the Commissioner of statements made in proceedings in Parliament is authorised by this section."

Drafting note — May 2026: the carve-out from Article 9 is now exercised by the House itself through a resolution, not invoked unilaterally by a statutory officer. This locates the limitation on privilege inside Parliament's own constitutional authority — the only authority that can limit Article 9.

42   Amendment to Imperial Laws Application Act 1988

In Schedule 1, after the entry relating to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688, insert:

"Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 does not prevent the investigation of knowingly false statements of material fact or misleading spin by the Political Integrity Commissioner under the Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Act 2026, subject to the procedural safeguards in that Act."

43   Amendment to Electoral Act 1993

(2) In section 199A, replace "during the specified period" with "at any time during the parliamentary term."

(3) In section 199A, after "publishes or republishes a statement" insert "on any public platform (as defined in the Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Act 2026)."

(4) After section 199A, insert:

"199B — Misleading spin to influence voters. A person is guilty of a corrupt practice who, with the intention of influencing the vote of an elector, engages in misleading spin (as defined in the Political Integrity (Misinformation Accountability) Act 2026) on any public platform at any time during the parliamentary term."
Part 5 · Safeguards, appeals, review, sunset

44   Protected speech

(1) Nothing in this Act applies to —

(a) a genuine statement of opinion, belief, or political judgement clearly presented as such, that does not contain or imply a specific factual claim the member knows to be false;

(b) a statement honestly believed to be true, where the member did not know and could not reasonably have known it was false;

(c) a statement of fact made in good faith reliance on an identified official source or expert advice;

(d) satire, humour, or rhetorical exaggeration no reasonable person would interpret as a statement of fact.

(2) For the avoidance of doubt, a statement is not protected merely because it is prefaced with "I believe", "I think", "in my view", or similar phrases, if it contains or implies a specific factual claim the member knows to be false. The Commissioner must look through the form of the statement to its substance.

(3) Context, audience, platform, and manner of delivery must all be considered.

45   Right of appeal

A member subject to a finding may appeal to the High Court on a question of law or fact, within 20 working days of publication. The High Court may confirm, set aside, refer back, or vary the penalty.

46   Vexatious complaints

The Commissioner may dismiss a complaint without investigation if it is frivolous, vexatious, made for a predominantly political purpose unrelated to genuine concern about misinformation, or outside the scope of the Act. Written reasons must be provided.

47   Review of Act

The Minister must commence a review within 3 years of commencement, covering complaints received, effectiveness of the penalty regime, any unintended consequences, the independence and resourcing of the Commissioner, and the operation of correction requirements. A report is presented to the House within 12 months of commencing the review.

48   Sunset clause

This Act is repealed 10 years after commencement unless the House resolves before that date to continue it. A continuation resolution may extend it for a further period not exceeding 10 years.


This draft is prepared for discussion purposes and does not constitute formal legal advice. Formal drafting of New Zealand legislation is undertaken by the Parliamentary Counsel Office (PCO).

Working draft for public discussion.

05 — What's happening overseas

New Zealand wouldn't be doing this alone.

Several democracies have tried, are trying, or have already enacted laws holding politicians accountable for misinformation. Some are good models. Some are cautionary tales. Honest assessment of each:

🏴󠁧󠁢󠁷󠁬󠁳󠁿   Wales — first in the Westminster world

Enacted · April 2026

Member Accountability and Elections Act 2026

Building on earlier work by Adam Price MS (Plaid Cymru), the Welsh Government's Member Accountability and Elections Bill passed the Senedd 50–1 on 17 March 2026 and received Royal Assent on 27 April 2026. Wales is now the first Westminster jurisdiction to have a law that holds elected representatives directly accountable for deliberate deception.

The Welsh Act creates a duty on Senedd Members to prohibit false statements of fact during election campaigns, a recall mechanism, and an independent judicial disqualification process for deliberate deception. It is narrower than the NZ bill — scoped to election periods rather than the full parliamentary term — but it proves the constitutional and political path exists.

The "no Western democracy has done this" objection no longer holds. New Zealand would be following an established precedent, not breaking new ground.

🇬🇧   United Kingdom — Westminster

Petition / amendment stage

"Compassion in Politics" amendment

A cross-party amendment, championed by the Compassion in Politics campaign and explicitly framed as "the law that could stop a British Trump," would create a standalone criminal offence for MPs who intentionally or recklessly mislead the public.

A linked UK Parliament petition crossed the threshold for parliamentary consideration. No bill has been formally introduced; the existing convention is that ministers who mislead Parliament resign — there is no legal sanction.

🇫🇷   France

Enacted · narrow scope

Loi contre la manipulation de l'information (2018)

Allows a judge to issue an emergency order against false information in the 3 months before an election. Imposes transparency duties on online platforms. Judicially supervised — not a ministerial power.

Often cited as a more measured model than executive-led approaches, but limited to election windows. NZ's bill goes further: full parliamentary term, statements outside election campaigns, year-round.

🇸🇬   Singapore — cautionary example

Enacted · widely criticised

Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA, 2019)

Gives ministers the power to issue correction or takedown orders for online statements they consider false. Penalties: up to S$50,000 and 5 years' prison for individuals.

Frequently criticised internationally as a tool used disproportionately against political opposition and dissenters. This is a model NZ's bill explicitly does not follow: our Commissioner is independent, judicially-supervised, and targets politicians — not citizens.

No federal bill in Australia, Canada, or the United States addresses this directly. In Australia, misleading a parliamentary committee is treated as contempt; there is no statutory offence for political misinformation more broadly. US First Amendment protections make any analogous federal law constitutionally implausible.

06 — Public comments

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07 — How to support

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Sources & references

About this page

This is a draft Member's Bill prepared for public discussion. Not formal legislation; not legal advice. New Zealand legislation is formally drafted by the Parliamentary Counsel Office.

© 2026. Public discussion document.